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Recent Developments

City of Frederick v. Shankle
Expert Testimony Denying a Statutory Presumption is Inadmissible

By Derek Rossillon

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that expert
testimony denying the presumption
that there was a correlation between
occupational stress and heart disease
in police officers and firefighters is
inadmissible pursuantto § 9-503 of
the Labor and Employment Article of
the Maryland Code. City of
Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5,
785 A.2d 749 (2001). However, the
court stated an expert is permitted to
testify that for a particular individual,
job stress was not a contributing factor
to heart disease "ifthere is a sufficient
factual basis for the conclusion." Id.
at 15, 785 A.2d at 755.
Donald Shankle ("Shankle")
worked as a police officer for the City
of Frederick from 1974to 1996. On
April 2, 1996, Shankle filed a
workers' compensation claim
asserting the job stress he endured for
the past 20 years resulted in heart
disease. In May of 1996, Shankle
underwent by-pass surgery. The
Workers' Compensation Commission
found that he suffered from a
compensable occupational heart
disease and awarded him benefits for
two periods of temporary total
disability. The City of Frederick
("City") sought judicial review ofthe
board's decision.
Prior to trial in circuit court,
the City took the deposition of Dr.
Alan Wassennan ("Wasserman"),
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who would testify as an expert in
cardiology. Although he never
examined Shankle, Wasserman
reviewed Shankle's medical records
and detennined that he had at least
four of the five risk factors for heart
disease. He further testified that the
link between stress and the risk of
coronary disease is "not accepted in
the medical community." Wasserman
rejected the presumption set forth in
section 9-503, which states "being a
policeman or fireman contributes to
the development of the coronary
artery disease."
In response to Wassennan's
testimony, Shankle moved to exclude
the doctor's deposition testimony as
it misinterpreted Maryland law by
disregarding the presumption
established in the statute. The Circuit
Court for Frederick County granted
the motion, and as Wassennan was
the City's only witness, they were left
with no evidence to rebut the statutory
presumption of compensability. As
such, summary judgment was granted
in favor of Shankle. The City
appealed and the court of special
appeals affirmed the circuit court's
ruling. On writ ofcertiorari, the court
of appeals upheld the lower courts'
rulings.
The Maryland Workers'
Compensation Act ("Act") "requires
employers to pay certain workers'
compensation benefits to covered

employees who suffer disability
resulting from an occupational
disease." !d. at 8, 785A.2dat751
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., Labor and
Employment § 9-502). However, an
employer is only liable if the
occupati onal disease that caused the
disability is reasonably related to the
type of work that the employee
performs and the injury was incurred
as a result of the employment. Id.
Section 9-503 of the Act establishes
a presumption that there is a
correlation between job stress and
heart disease with respect to fire
fighters and police officers. Id. at 12,
785 A.2d at 753.
Past decisions have reaffirmed
that the statute is a legislative
determination ofthe correlation. See
Montgomery Co. Fire Bd. v. Fisher,
298 Md. 245,468 A.2d 625 (1983)
and Lovellette v. City ofBaltimore,
297 Md. 271, 465 A.2d 1141
(1983). "In furtherance of that
determination, the Legislature has
created a presumption of
compensability when a fire fighter or
police officer contracts heart
disease." Shankle, 367 Md. at 12,
785 A.2d at 754 (citing Lovellette
at 284, 465 A.2d at 1148). The
court pointed out that the statute has
a "Morgan-type" presumption, which
is a formidable burden on the party
against whom it operates. Id. at 12,
785 A.2d at 754. The legislative
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intent ofthe statute mandates both the
burden of production and the burden
of persuasion remain fixed on the
employer. Id.
However, the statute is not
irrebutable in that an employee's
occupation only has to be a factor to
have the employee's disease be
compensable. Id. at 13,785 A.2d at
754 (citing Montgomery Co. v.
Pirrone, 109 Md. App. 201, 674
A.2d 98 (1996)). The court stated
that the City's main argument was
based on a misinterpretation of the
Pirrone case. Id. The City'S
understanding of Pirrone was "in
order to rebut the legislative
presumption, an employer must
establish that the claimant's occupation
as a fire fighter or police officer could
not be a factor in causing the disease
.... " Id. The correct interpretation
of Pirrone suggests rebutting the
legislative presumption requires an
employer to offer evidence that the
employee's disease is attributable to
another cause outside of his
occupation. Shankle, 367 Md. at 1415, 785 A.2d at 755.
The court stressed that the
evidence given to rebut a statutory
presumption must be specific to the
employee. Id. at 15, 785A.2dat755.
F or instance, it is permissible for the
employer's expert to state that the
employee's disease did not result from
his employment as a police officer "if
there is sufficient factual basis for the
conclusion." Id. Testimony stating a
police officer endured lower stress
because he worked in an
administrative capacity is admissible
as it relates to the amount of job
stress. Id. Testimony that simply

denies the presumption is not
admissible pursuant to Maryland
Rules of Evidence 5-702 and 5-403.
Id. at 15, 785 A.2d at 756.
Rule 5-702 allows testimony
that "assist[ s] the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." Id. at 1516,785 A.2d at 755-756. Rule 5403 permits the exclusion of relevant
evidence ifit could confuse or misleaR
the jury or is unfairly prejudicial.
Shankl, 367 Md. at. at 16, 785 A.2d
at756. The court held Wasserman's
testimony did not fulfill the
requirements of Rules 5-702 and 5403 as it could not assist the jury in
determining causation. Moreover,
such testimony could only confuse or
mislead the jury. Id. As such, the
court upheld the exclusion of
Wasserman's testimony. Id.
The decision to exclude
Wasserman's testimony demonstrated
the court's commitrnentto abide by
the legislative intent ofthe statute. Fire
fighters and police officers have
extremely stressful and dangerous jobs
and many ofthem retire with lingering
health problems. While many people
have stress in their jobs, firefighters
and police officers risk their lives to
serve the public. Section 9-503
ensures public service employees that
they will receive benefits for injuries
sustained while on the job. In order
to maintain a police force or fire
squad, a city's employees must know
they will be rewarded for their valor
and compensated for their injuries.
For this reason, the statute's rebuttable
presumption is necessary.
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